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765 
NOTHING NEW, MAN!—THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT’S CLARIFICATION OF INSIDER 
TRADING LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES v. 
NEWMAN COMES AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
IN THE EVOLUTION OF INSIDER TRADING 
Abstract: On December 10, 2014, in United States v. Newman, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified what is required for remote tippees to be 
liable in insider trading cases. The government has argued that the Newman deci-
sion is unprecedented and will make it far more difficult to prosecute insider 
trading defendants. This Note argues that the Newman decision is consistent with 
precedent and the principles of criminal law and comes at a critical juncture 
where the SEC’s prosecutorial tactics do not square with the common law. Im-
portantly, Newman reins in prosecutorial overreaching aimed at those who are 
least culpable and will hopefully shift the government’s focus to the crux of the 
problem: corporate insiders who tip material, nonpublic information for a per-
sonal benefit. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this: you manage a successful hedge fund.1 You employ analysts 
who conduct market research to help you accurately price securities.2 The in-
formation these analysts generate affects your business judgment about in 
which securities to invest your fund’s assets.3 Now, one of your analysts comes 
to you with a “tip” on XYZ Company’s performance prior to its earnings an-
nouncement for the quarter.4 The company’s earnings are actually lower than 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See United States v. Newman (Newman I), 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Unit-
ed States v. Newman (Newman II), 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (mem.). 
 2 See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1023, 1025 (1990) (noting the role of investment analysts to discover information about securities and 
make recommendations); Marron C. Doherty, Note, Regulating Channel Checks: Clarifying the Le-
gality of Supply-Chain Research, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 470, 470 (2014) (discussing the 
practice of channel-checking by investment analysts). 
 3 See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1026 (discussing the relationship between investment funds 
and the investment analysts they employ); Doherty, supra note 2, at 477 (discussing how market pro-
fessionals collect and analyze all available information about companies to make investment deci-
sions). 
 4 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 443 (describing how analysts passed information they learned from 
company insiders to hedge fund portfolio managers Newman and Chiasson). 
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the market expects.5 Do you trade on this information without asking ques-
tions?6 After all, you hired the analyst for exactly this reason—to get infor-
mation so that you can accurately price securities and make informed invest-
ment decisions.7 Do you simply not trade on the information from this other-
wise trustworthy source merely because it may have been obtained improperly 
and thus constitutes insider trading?8 Do you ask where he got this nonpublic 
information?9 Do you have a duty to ask?10 
You ask because you do not want to trade on the information unless it is 
from a reliable source.11 Your analyst divulges that he received the tip from an 
analyst at AAA, another hedge fund.12 When pressed further you find out the 
following: the analyst at AAA received the information from an analyst at 
XXX and the analyst at XXX received the information from an employee of 
XYZ company.13 You are four degrees removed from the alleged source of in-
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. (discussing the situation where analysts received information from corporate insiders dis-
closing company earnings numbers before they were publicly released in quarterly earnings an-
nouncements). 
 6 See id. at 454 (describing how analysts routinely confirm their financial modeling assumptions 
with company investor relations departments). 
 7 See Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraud from Economic and Natural Law 
Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 95 (2007) (detailing how analyst recommendations shape inves-
tor decisions); Doherty, supra note 2, at 477 (discussing how market professionals use their superior 
resources to provide a window into a company’s “inner workings” so that they may accurately value 
the company to determine whether or not to invest). 
 8 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty 
to a source of information caused by secretly converting the source’s information for personal gain 
constitutes a fraud in violation of securities law); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (holding 
that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the 
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee 
and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach”); United States v. Chiarella, 445 
U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (holding that a duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises only from a specif-
ic fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence); Newman I, 773 F.3d at 442 (holding that 
for a tippee to be liable, he or she must know both (1) that an insider disclosed confidential infor-
mation and (2) that the insider did so in exchange for a personal benefit). 
 9 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 454 (noting that hedge fund analysts routinely use financial model-
ing to estimate metrics such as revenue and that internal relations departments tell the analysts wheth-
er the assumptions in their models are “too high or too low” or in the “ball park”). 
 10 See id. at 450 (noting that the defendants could be liable if they deliberately avoided learning 
that the information came from corporate insiders). 
 11 See id. (noting that company investor relations departments routinely disclose financial infor-
mation to gain favor with potential investors). But see Manuel Utset, Fraudulent Corporate Signals, 
Conduct as Securities Fraud, 54 B.C. L. REV. 645, 651 (2013) (noting that a corporate insider may 
selectively disclose certain information not to benefit the company, but instead to signal certain in-
formation to investors for his or her own benefit). 
 12 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson at 9, Newman I, 773 F.3d 438 (No. 13-
1917), 2013 WL 4497030 (noting that defendant Chiasson received the inside information from co-
defendant Newman’s analyst at Diamondback Capital). 
 13 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 443 (discussing the details of the two tipping chains at issue). 
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formation.14 You do not know the source of information, his or her position 
within XYZ, nor why he or she divulged this information.15 From your experi-
ence, you understand that it is industry practice for companies to selectively 
disclose such information to analysts prior to quarterly earnings releases.16 
Remembering the game of telephone from elementary school you ask yourself: 
“Should I really trade on this information or is it merely a rumor at this 
point?”17 
You decide to trade on the tip and, because it turned out to be accurate, 
you realize a substantial gain on your investment.18 At first, you are happy, 
your clients are happy, and you get to keep your job, but then you are indicted 
for securities fraud in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
(“Exchange Act”) and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
Rule 10b-5.19 You are tried and convicted by a jury of your peers.20 You are 
sentenced to six years in prison, you must disgorge the profits from the trade, 
and you must pay a multi-million dollar penalty.21 How do you feel? Is this 
outcome fair? Oh, by the way, the employee tipper at XYZ who started the 
chain was never prosecuted.22 How do you feel now? 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See id. (acknowledging that defendants Newman and Chiasson were three and four degrees 
removed, respectively, from the source of inside information in one tipping chain and four degrees 
removed from the source of inside information in the other tipping chain). 
 15 See id. (noting that there was no evidence that either defendant was aware of the source of the 
inside information). 
 16 See id. at 454 (finding that the evidence established that company investor relations personnel 
routinely leak earnings data in advance of quarterly earnings announcements). 
 17 See id. at 443 (highlighting how far removed the defendant traders were from the source of 
information). 
 18 See id. (noting that defendants Newman and Chiasson earned approximately $4 million and 
$68 million, respectively, in profits for their funds on the trades). 
 19 See id. (discussing the charges against Newman and Chiasson). Newman and Chiasson were 
charged with securities fraud in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
SEC Rule 10b-5. Id. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful for any 
person to use a manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of a public 
security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Section 10(b)(5) also delegates to the SEC the power to promul-
gate rules to protect investors from such deceptive practices. Id. Pursuant to section 10(b)’s rulemak-
ing power, the SEC has adopted Rule 10b-5, which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud [or] . . . (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 20 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 444–45 (returning a jury verdict of guilty on all counts). 
 21 See id. (discussing the prison sentencing, fines, and assessments levied against Newman and 
Chiasson). 
 22 See id. at 443 (noting that one of the insider tippers has yet to be charged criminally for insider 
trading, while the other insider tipper has yet to be charged administratively, civilly, or criminally). 
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The above hypothetical is derived from the facts of United States v. New-
man, an insider trading case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in 2014.23 The Newman decision, which helps clarify the insider 
trading landscape, comes at a critical juncture where the SEC plans to bring 
more insider trading cases in-house.24 Some have criticized the Newman deci-
sion, arguing that it unfairly limits the SEC’s power to pursue insider trading 
cases and gives traders a roadmap by which to commit securities fraud.25 
This Note argues that Newman properly limited the SEC’s expansion of 
insider trading liability and that the SEC should reevaluate its prosecutorial 
tactics in light of Newman.26 Part I of this Note discusses the development of 
insider trading law and the requirements for insider trading liability.27 Part II 
details the arguments for both sides and the ultimate decision by the Second 
Circuit in United States v. Newman.28 Finally, Part III argues that the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Newman is consistent with precedent and the principles of 
criminal law.29 Part III also explains why it is important to rein in the SEC’s 
prosecutorial overreach and why the government should shift its focus to in-
sider-tippers who are the crux of the problem.30 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See id. at 455 (vacating the convictions of defendants Newman and Chiasson and remanding to 
the district court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice). The government petitioned for a rehearing 
but the Second Circuit denied it. See Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Re-
hearing En Banc at 2–3, Newman I, 773 F.3d 438 (No. 13-1837(L)), 2015 WL 1064423. The govern-
ment also petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, but the Court denied it without comment. 
See Newman II, 136 S. Ct. at 242. 
 24 See Ed Beeson, SEC Retooling Insider Trading Tactics After Newman, LAW360 (Nov. 4, 2015, 
10:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/723289/sec-retooling-insider-trading-tactics-after-
newman [https://perma.cc/K892-596S] (noting how prosecutors have had to redirect their attention to 
meet the Newman evidentiary standards); Joel Cohen et al., SEC Plans to Play Insider-Trading Cases 
on Home Court, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 16, 2014, at 1–2, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/CohenDunningHarris-SECPlansToPlayInsiderTradingCases.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8V9-
YJ76] (discussing the implications of bringing insider trading cases as administrative proceedings 
within the SEC); Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC Admin Judge Will Apply Newman to Insider Trading 
Case, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/620709/sec-admin-judge-
will-apply-newman-to-insider-trading-case [https://perma.cc/L8U2-FSDL] (quoting an SEC adminis-
trative law judge who said he would apply the Newman reasoning in an administrative proceeding 
before him). 
 25 See Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 
23, at 22 (noting that Newman “threatens the integrity of the securities markets”); Alan Lieberman, 
Major Developments in SEC Enforcement, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION 1, 7 
(2015 ed.), 2015 WL 2407608, at *6 (noting that Newman may have signaled a “seismic shift” in the 
enforcement of insider trading laws). 
 26 See infra notes 31–214 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 31–110 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 111–146 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 147–176 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 177–214 and accompanying text. 
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Insider trading liability is a convoluted area of law that has developed 
through judicial interpretation of federal statutes and SEC regulations.31 Sec-
tion A of this Part reviews the statutory basis and rationales of insider trading 
law rooted in section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.32 Sec-
tion B explains the current state of insider trading law premised on a breach of 
a fiduciary duty constituting a fraud.33 Finally, section C briefly discusses two 
additional elements required for insider trading liability: materiality and scien-
ter.34 
A. The Basis and Rationales of Insider Trading Law 
Generally speaking, insider trading is unlawfully trading securities based 
on material nonpublic information.35 Nevertheless, federal securities statutes 
do not explicitly prohibit insider trading.36 Rather, the law of insider trading 
has developed primarily through the common law of securities fraud, interpre-
tations of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder.37 Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to engage in fraudu-
lent behavior in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.38 
The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Ex-
change Act was to deter fraud and promote investor confidence in the securi-
ties markets.39 Congress intended regulations promulgated under the Exchange 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650–52 (analyzing whether the misappropriation theory of insider 
trading is consistent with the text and purpose of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder by the SEC); Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Fi-
nancial Crisis, Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the 
Insider Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 363 (discussing the convoluted history and 
common law evolution of insider trading law). 
 32 See infra notes 35–57 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 58–99 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 100–110 and accompanying text. 
 35 See C. EDWARD FLETCHER, MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 3 (1991) (“[Insider 
trading] is probably best defined, to the extent any definition is adequate, as ‘the purchase or sale of 
securities on the basis of material, non-public information.’”); Insider Trading, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 36 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (prohibiting fraud but not specifically insider trading); 17 C.F.R 
§ 240.10b-5 (same). 
 37 See Jimmy Fokas & Yulia Fradkin, 2nd Circuit Slams the Door on ‘Soft Benefit’ Insider Trad-
ing; Will Congress Pry It Back Open?, 21 WESTLAW J. SEC. LIT. & REG., no. 2, May 28, 2015, at *1, 
*1 (noting that insider trading law has been shaped by decades of judge-made precedent); Donna M. 
Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1322 
(2009) (noting that insider trading law is essentially judge-made). 
 38 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (making it unlawful for any person to engage in conduct that “would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of a security”). 
 39 John A. MacKerron, The Price Integrity Cause of Action Under Rule 10b-5: Limiting and Ex-
panding the Use of the Fraud on the Market Theory, 69 OR. L. REV. 177, 179 (1990) (discussing how 
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Act to protect investors against insider manipulation of stock prices by impos-
ing reporting requirements on companies that list their stock on national secu-
rities exchanges.40 These reporting requirements sought to make it difficult for 
companies to manipulate the public’s perception of their financial state and 
facilitate investors’ ability to interpret the required financial information dis-
tributed by the company.41 
Insider trading is perhaps the most emblematic, yet misunderstood, white-
collar crime.42 There are two competing policy rationales for why the United 
States has disclosure requirements and holds individuals liable for trading on 
material nonpublic information.43 The first is the fairness or “parity of infor-
mation” rationale, which has been backed by the SEC from the inception of Rule 
10b-5 to its more recent regulations.44 The second is the duty rationale that is 
premised on an efficient market theory, which has been expressly adopted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.45 
                                                                                                                           
the legislative history to the Securities Act and Exchange Act indicates that protection of individual 
investors and restoration of confidence in the securities markets were Congress’s primary concerns); 
Michelle N. Comeau, Comment, The Hidden Contradiction Within Insider Trading Regulation, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 1275, 1283 (referencing the U.S. Supreme Court cases that outline the purpose of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act). 
 40 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (discussing how the Exchange Act was 
intended to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation and the imposi-
tion of regular reporting requirements). 
 41 See id. (discussing the rationale behind the Securities Act); Comeau, supra note 39, at 1283 
(discussing how reporting requirements would increase investor confidence in the securities markets). 
 42 See Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on the Use 
of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 126–27 (2001) (noting 
the notoriety associated with the prosecution of insider trading cases on Wall Street during the 1980s); 
Neil V. Shah, Note, Section 20a and the Struggle for Coherence, Meaning, and Fundamental Fairness 
in the Express Right of Action for Contemporaneous Insider Trading Liability, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 
791, 797–98 (2009) (highlighting prominent insider trading cases in the 1980s involving notorious 
high-profile defendants such as Dennis Levine, Michael Milken, and Ivan Boesky, who served as the 
inspiration for Gordon Gecko in the movie “Wall Street”). 
 43 Compare Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (acknowledging the fairness rationale), with William O. 
Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 
843, 854 (2005) (discussing the efficient market theory). 
 44 See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2015) (requiring simultaneous public disclo-
sure of information any time an insider discloses material, nonpublic information); In re Cady, Rob-
erts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912–13 (1961) (adopting the fairness rationale). 
 45 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (holding that because there is no general duty to the market general-
ly, “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the 
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach”). Both of these rationales are intended to 
promote investor confidence in the securities market, albeit for different reasons. See Comeau, supra 
note 39, at 1280 (describing investor confidence as a general conviction that investors trust the stock 
market enough to purchase securities). Investor confidence includes trust of intermediaries and institu-
tional mechanisms, as well as the regulatory system in place to ensure the integrity of capital markets. 
Id. at 1280–81. 
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The fairness rationale is based on the premise that federal securities laws 
should create a system that provides equal access to information in the securities 
market, a parity of information, which is necessary for investors to make rea-
soned and intelligent investment decisions.46 According to this rationale, using 
information not generally available to the market to trade in securities is fraudu-
lent because it gives corporate insiders with access to information an unfair ad-
vantage over less informed shareholders or other buyers and sellers of securi-
ties.47 Investors would be discouraged from participating in the securities market 
because they would have no way of knowing whether they were at an unfair dis-
advantage.48 Under this fairness rationale, insider trading is undesirable because 
it is fundamentally unfair to those investors lacking the same access to infor-
mation as insiders.49 The uninformed investor is harmed to the extent he or she 
would have made a different investment decision had he or she had access to 
the same inside information.50 The SEC has utilized this rationale to persuade 
courts to expand the law of insider trading.51 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (discussing the appellate court’s decision, which rested on the fair-
ness rationale that federal securities laws have “created a system providing equal access to infor-
mation necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions”); Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma 
of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 189 (2006) (discussing the parity of information ra-
tionale employed by the SEC in insider trading cases). 
 47 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (“The use by anyone of material information not generally available 
is fraudulent, [the fairness theory] suggests, because such information gives certain buyers or sellers 
an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers.”); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that Rule 10b-5 is based on the policy that all investors should 
have “relatively equal access to material information”). 
 48 See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 851–52 (stating that the purpose behind section 10(b) 
and the promulgation of Rule 10b-5 is that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of 
participating in the securities market and be subject to identical market risks); Victor Brudney, Insid-
ers, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
322, 339–40 (1979) (discussing how preventing informational advantages in the market has been 
proffered as a rationale for parity-of-information). 
 49 See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 852 (noting the inequalities based upon access to in-
formation). The European Union has adopted this rationale for its own securities fraud legislation. Ste-
phen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330, 358 (de-
scribing how the European Union has fully embraced the parity-of-information approach); James B. 
Stewart, Delving into the Morass of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/12/20/business/the-insider-trading-morass.html?_r=0 (quoting Professor Marco 
Ventoruzzo as stating, “The European approach, by contrast, is much simpler . . . . ‘If you have material, 
inside information, you can’t trade on it, period’ . . . .”). Congress, however, has not adopted this parity-
of-information rule. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 50 See Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Infor-
mation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1115 (1985) (discussing the harm caused by the informational disad-
vantage); Comeau, supra note 39, at 1281 (same). 
 51 See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding defendants liable 
for insider trading under the misappropriation theory because in their role as newspaper employees 
they had access to confidential information regarding companies in advance of publications dissemi-
nated to the public at large), aff’d, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848 (hold-
ing that anyone in possession of material inside information must disclose it to the investing public or 
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Whereas parity-of-information is easy to understand and plays to the pub-
lic’s sense of fairness, the efficient market rationale is more abstract and suggests 
fewer restrictions on insider trading.52 The efficient market rationale promotes 
investor confidence in the securities market by assuming that a security’s price 
promptly reacts to new and unexpected information.53 Under this rationale, trad-
ing based on nonpublic, material information contributes to efficient stock mar-
ket pricing because information relevant to a stock’s value becomes embedded in 
stock prices more quickly than if the public had to wait until such information 
was disclosed.54 Additionally, the efforts of market professionals, such as ana-
lysts, help bring security prices in line with the underlying value of the asset.55 
The profits made by these market professionals are therefore an appropriate re-
                                                                                                                           
abstain from trading on that information); In re Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037, 1040 (1969) (sanction-
ing broker-dealer for trading on the basis of non-public information he obtained from a Federal Re-
serve Bank employee); Coles, supra note 46, at 189–90 (noting that by promoting the general fairness 
rationale, prosecutors were able to expand the law of insider trading until the Court decisively ruled in 
Chiarella). 
 52 See Eric Engle, Insider Trading: Incoherent in Theory, Inefficient in Practice, 32 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 37, 61 (2007) (arguing that although insider trading looks unfair it is a good thing because 
it renders the markets more efficient); Comeau, supra note 39, at 1301 (“[I]nvestor protection has a 
great deal of populist appeal, while the promotion of efficient markets appears . . . at best . . . coldly 
technocratic, and at worst, anti-populist—we’re siding with Wall Street against Main Street.”). 
 53 See Fisher, supra note 43, at 854 (discussing the efficient market theory that courts employ in 
securities litigation). A market can achieve “mechanical efficiency” if it promptly responds to infor-
mation, without having “value efficiency” in which it generates prices reflecting the actual economic 
values of securities calculated by risk and expected returns. Id. at 852–53; see also Daniel R. Fischel, 
Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 
914 (1989) (noting that the best model for ascertaining the true value of a publicly-traded firm’s assets 
is looking at the prices of its securities). 
 54 See Engle, supra note 52, at 61 (arguing that insider trading creates a more efficient market); 
Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 110–11 (1998) (discussing the academic debate on whether insider trading 
contributes to, or undermines, market efficiency). Those who think insider trading makes markets 
inefficient argue, among other things, that (1) allowing insider trading encourages insiders to manipu-
late corporate decision-making and withhold relevant information from the market, and (2) the infor-
mation companies make available to analysts does not reflect all the information upon which insiders 
are trading, thereby preventing accurate valuation and pricing of stocks. See Karmel, supra, at 110–
11. 
 55 See In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that efforts by 
market professionals push the price of securities towards a value that reflects all publicly available 
information), aff’d, 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993); Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock 
Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 
59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1421 (2004) (noting that corporate finance theory holds that a stock’s price re-
flects the market’s estimation of the company’s future discounted cash flows); Jonathan R. Macey et 
al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. 
Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1991) (arguing that stock price is a good estimate of invest-
ment value because it is equal to the present value of the expected discounted cash flows from the 
stock to its owners). 
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ward for their labor.56 As discussed further below, under this rationale then, in-
sider trading is undesirable only to the extent it benefits a corporate insider to the 
detriment of the company’s shareholders or source of information.57 
B. Insider Trading Law Premised on Duty, Not Premised on  
Equal Access to Information in the Market 
Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly stated that not all se-
curities trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information constitutes 
fraud in violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.58 The Court has repeatedly 
found that liability for insider trading cannot be based on the notion that the 
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 require equal infor-
mation among all traders in the securities market.59 In 1983, in Dirks v. SEC, 
the Court noted the adverse effect such a broad rule would have on market ana-
lysts, whose role is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.60 Instead, 
the Court, through its three insider trading opinions, has built its jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring) (“Ef-
ficient capital markets depend on the protection of property rights in information. However, they also 
require that persons who acquire and act on information about companies be able to profit from the 
information they generate . . . .”); Karmel, supra note 56, at 110. If market professionals had to wait to 
trade until after disclosure to the public, it would be too late to reap any reward from their labor. See 
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (noting that efficient markets require that those who generate information are 
able to profit from it as long as it does not amount to theft). Additionally, if certain investors believe it is 
worthwhile to seek out valuable market information, investing considerable time and effort to “beat 
the market” with better research, those efforts enhance market efficiency. Id.; Daniel R. Fischel, Use 
of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 4–5 (1982) (noting that market professionals who have a competitive advantage in obtaining 
and interpreting relevant information have an incentive to do so and take actions that will affect the 
market price). 
 57 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty to a source of infor-
mation by secretly converting the source’s information for personal gain constitutes a fraud in viola-
tion of securities law); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (holding that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty not to 
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to 
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that 
there has been a breach”). 
 58 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27 (emphasizing that there is no general duty to forgo market transac-
tions based on material, nonpublic information because such a broad duty to the market would “depart 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two par-
ties”). 
 59 Id. at 657; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (holding that a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does 
not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information and noting that a contrary result 
would be inconsistent with the “careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of the securities 
markets”). 
 60 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (“Imposing a duty to disclose . . . solely because a person knowingly 
receives . . . information from an insider . . . could have an inhibiting influence on . . . market analysts, 
which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”). Market ana-
lysts “ferret out and analyze information” by questioning corporate insiders to establish a basis for the 
market price and underlying value of a corporation’s securities. Id. at 658–59. 
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on the idea that only certain individuals have a duty to either disclose inside 
information or abstain from trading on it.61 
As it stands today, insider trading liability stems from a breach of fiduci-
ary duty constituting a fraud under Rule 10b-5.62 Subsection 1 discusses the 
development of the classical theory of insider trading.63 Subsection 2 explores 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s express adoption of the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading in United States v. O’Hagan.64 Subsection 3 examines how tip-
pers and tippees of material, nonpublic information can be liable under either 
theory of insider trading.65 
1. Classical Theory 
Under the classical theory of insider trading liability, a corporate insider 
commits fraud under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he or she trades in the 
securities of the corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.66 
Trading on such information without disclosing it breaches a fiduciary duty 
owed to the shareholders of the corporation.67 The existence of the fiduciary 
relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading so as to pre-
vent the corporate insider from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed 
stockholders.68 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty to a source of infor-
mation by secretly converting the source’s information for personal gain constitutes a fraud in viola-
tion of securities law); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (holding that a duty to dis-
close or abstain from trading arises only from a specific fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and 
confidence). 
 62 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 449 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had previously established 
that insider trading liability is based on breaches of fiduciary duty, not on informational asymmetries); 
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (noting that the rationale behind insider trading law stops “well short” of 
prohibiting all trading on material nonpublic information). 
 63 See infra notes 66–82 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 65 See infra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. 
 66 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52. A corporate “insider” is not limited to officers or directors of a 
corporation, as the definition also applies to temporary insiders like attorneys, accountants, or consult-
ants who temporarily become fiduciaries of the corporation. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. 
 67 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (“Trading on such information qualifies as a ‘deceptive device’ . . . 
because ‘a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and 
those insiders . . . .’” (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228)). 
 68 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29. Shareholders are harmed when an insider uses the material, 
nonpublic information to trade in the securities of the corporation to the extent that the information 
would have caused shareholders to seek trades of their securities had they been privy to the same 
information. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 673 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the harm to the sharehold-
ers). 
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The SEC established the “disclose or abstain” rule that epitomizes insider 
trading law in 1961, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.69 In that case, the SEC set 
forth the elements for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation: (1) the existence of 
a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available 
only for a corporate purpose, and (2) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.70 
Based on the fairness rationale, judicial and regulatory decisions following In 
re Cady expanded the duty to disclose or abstain into a broad duty to all partic-
ipants in the market.71 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, decisively reined in this disclosure du-
ty in 1980 in Chiarella v. United States.72 In Chiarella, the Court held that a 
duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises only from a specific fiduciary or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence.73 The defendant obtained nonpub-
lic information about upcoming mergers through his job as a “markup man” 
for a financial printer.74 He was convicted for purchasing stock in the target 
companies of the mergers and selling them immediately after the takeover bids 
were made public.75 To the Court, the Rule 10b-5 duty to disclose prior to trad-
ing sought to ensure that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place 
the shareholder’s welfare before their own, would not benefit personally 
through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.76 Because it found 
                                                                                                                           
 69 In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911 (noting that an affirmative duty to disclose material in-
formation has been traditionally imposed on corporate “insiders,” particularly officers, directors, or 
controlling stockholders). 
 70 Id. (“[I]nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position 
but which are not known to persons with whom they deal . . . . Failure to make disclosure in these 
circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions.”). In this case, directors of a public 
company decided to reduce the amount of a dividend to shareholders. Id. at 909. After the decision 
was made, one of the directors informed a broker who avoided a significant loss by selling shares of 
the company’s stock before the news went public. Id. The SEC held that the director violated Rule 
10b-5. Id. at 911. 
 71 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(holding that defendants breached a duty to disclose or abstain from trading owed to all persons who 
purchased the relevant stock in the open market without knowledge of the material inside information 
possessed by defendants); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848 (explaining that Rule 10b-5 “is 
based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on 
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to information”). 
 72 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–30 (premising liability on a breach of fiduciary duty). 
 73 Id. at 228–30, 232 (finding that “[n]o duty could arise from petitioner’s relationship with the 
sellers of the target company’s securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them”). 
 74 Id. at 224. 
 75 Id. at 224–25. 
 76 Id. at 230. The Court reversed because the jury instructions erroneously stated that defendant 
was liable for fraud if he “did not disclose . . . material non-public information in connection with the 
purchases of stock.” Id. at 236. The Court refused to decide whether an insider owes such a fiduciary 
duty to disclose or abstain to both sellers and buyers of securities, the latter of whom are not share-
holders at the time of the transaction. Id. at 235–36. 
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that the defendant had no duty to the target company’s shareholders, the Court 
reversed his conviction.77 
Three years later in 1983, in Dirks v. SEC, the Court again found that in-
dividuals have no duty to disclose or abstain from trading unless they are a 
corporation’s agent, a fiduciary, or a person in whom the sellers of securities 
have placed their trust or confidence.78 The Court followed Chiarella and con-
tinued to refuse to recognize a general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.79 At the 
same time, the Court in Dirks recognized that there were circumstances where 
corporate outsiders could become temporary insiders owing a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders.80 Thus, under the classical theory, a corporate “insider” is not 
limited to officers or directors of a corporation, but also to temporary insiders 
— those who temporarily become fiduciaries of the corporation, such as attor-
neys, accountants or consultants.81 In sum, to be liable under the classical theo-
ry of insider trading, a defendant must be an insider, temporary insider, or tip-
pee of an insider or temporary insider of the traded corporation.82 
2. Misappropriation Theory 
Whereas the classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty 
to shareholders, the misappropriation theory of insider trading targets a corpo-
rate outsider’s breach of duty to a source of information.83 Under the misap-
propriation theory, an individual commits fraud under section 10(b) and Rule 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. 
 78 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654–55 (acknowledging that the Court’s opinion in Chiarella left unclear 
how a tippee could acquire the duty to disclose or refrain from trading on inside information if he or 
she owed no fiduciary duty like the insider-tipper). 
 79 Id. (“Not to require such a fiduciary relationship . . . would ‘depar[t] radically from the estab-
lished doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties’ and would amount to 
‘recognizing a general duty between all participants in [the] market . . . .’” (quoting Chiarella, 445 
U.S. at 230)). 
 80 Id. at 655 n.14 (highlighting that the basis for recognizing a fiduciary duty is that the insider 
enters into a special confidential relationship to conduct business for the enterprise and is given access 
to information for that exclusive purpose). 
 81 Id. (“Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately 
to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may 
become fiduciaries of the shareholders.”). In Chiarella, the Court never reached the question of 
whether Chiarella was a “temporary insider” with respect to the acquiring and target companies in his 
role as a markup man. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 82 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (recognizing that temporary insiders have a duty to disclose or 
abstain from trading); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (holding that a duty to disclose or abstain from trad-
ing arises only from a fiduciary relationship). 
 83 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (explaining that under the misappropriation theory, a fiduciary’s 
undisclosed use of its principal’s information to personally benefit in the trade of securities constitutes 
a breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality and defrauds the principal corporation of the exclu-
sive use of that information). 
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10b-5 when he or she misappropriates material, nonpublic information for se-
curities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the infor-
mation.84 
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory in United 
States v. O’Hagan in 1997.85 In O’Hagan, the Court held the misappropriation 
theory was consistent with securities fraud under section 10(b), and upheld the 
conviction of an attorney who misappropriated material, nonpublic information 
from his law firm and its client.86 As the Court noted, breaching a fiduciary 
duty to a source of information by secretly converting the source’s information 
for personal gain while feigning loyalty to the source constitutes a fraud.87 The 
misappropriation theory thus extends insider trading law to prevent corporate 
“outsiders” who have access to a corporation’s confidential information, but no 
fiduciary duty to the corporation or its shareholders, from trading on the basis 
of that information.88 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. (observing that a fiduciary who feigns loyalty to his or her principal while secretly convert-
ing the principal’s information for personal gain defrauds the principal). 
 85 Id. at 650 (holding that criminal liability under section 10(b) may be predicated on the misap-
propriation theory). The O’Hagan Court stated that its prior holding in Chiarella did not provide that 
a fiduciary relationship was the only special relationship between two parties giving rise to liability 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 661. 
 86 Id. at 665 (adopting the misappropriation theory as both consistent with section 10(b) and 
Court precedent). The Court held that the misappropriation theory satisfies section 10(b)’s require-
ment that the deceptive use of information be “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security” 
even though the deceptive act happens before and independent of any securities trading. Id. at 655–56. 
The defendant was a partner in a law firm that represented Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand Met”). 
Id. at 647. Grand Met retained the firm to represent it regarding a potential tender offer for stock in the 
Pillsbury Company (“Pillsbury”). Id. Although defendant himself did no work for Grand Met, he used 
Grand Met’s material, nonpublic information to trade on the Pillsbury stock, making a profit of more 
than $4.3 million. Id. 
 87 Id. at 655 (recognizing that because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory in-
volves feigning loyalty to the principal, there is no deception and no violation of section 10(b) if the 
fiduciary discloses to the principal that he or she plans to trade on the nonpublic information). 
 88 Id. at 653. Additionally, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2, which extended the misappropria-
tion theory by stating that people engage in fiduciary duties to sources of information whenever they 
agree to maintain information in confidence. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2015). A duty of confidence is 
not the same as a fiduciary duty, and someone can breach a duty of confidentiality without breaching 
his or her fiduciary duties. Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”: Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), 
Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of Insider Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
1469, 1486 (2010) (discussing the implications of Rule 10b5-2). This rule, however, provides that a 
duty of confidentiality alone can satisfy the duty requirement, thus expanding the scope of insider 
trading law to capture any relationship covered by a confidentiality agreement. Id. 
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3. Tipper and Tippee: Derivative of Classical and Misappropriation 
Theories of Liability 
Individuals do not have to trade on material, nonpublic information to be 
liable under either theory of insider trading.89 Individuals also violate Rule 
10b-5 when they communicate or “tip” the information for an improper pur-
pose, regardless of whether they trade on the information themselves.90 Tip-
pees also may be liable for violating Rule 10b-5 if they trade on the material, 
nonpublic information or tip another person.91 Tipper-tippee chains are com-
mon in insider trading cases, and the SEC frequently brings cases against re-
mote tippees who may be many degrees removed from the initial tipper.92 
But if the tipper’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises from a 
duty owed either to shareholders (classical theory) or a source of information 
(misappropriation theory), from where does a tippee’s duty stem?93 In Dirks, 
the Court answered this question, holding that a tippee assumes a fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders not to trade on material, nonpublic information only 
when (1) the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by dis-
closing the information to the tippee and (2) the tippee knows or should know 
that there has been a breach.94 The Court found that a tippee’s duty to disclose 
information or abstain from trading is derivative from that of an insider’s du-
ty.95 In recognizing this derivative duty, the Court noted that those who know-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (“Not only are insiders forbidden . . . from personally using undisclosed 
corporate information . . . but they also may not give such information to an outsider for the same 
improper purpose . . . .”). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2012) (making it unlawful to do indirectly 
(i.e., by way of another person) any act made unlawful by federal securities laws). 
 90 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
 91 Id. (noting that in Chiarella, the Court viewed a tippee’s obligation arising from his or her role 
as a “participant after the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty”). A tippee can become a 
tipper by tipping information to someone else who trades on the material, nonpublic information. See 
Newman I, 773 F.3d at 446 (discussing how insider trading liability is not confined to those who trade 
but also to those who disclose to someone else who trades on the information). 
 92 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 442 (involving a tipping chain); SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 
(2d Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (in-
volving a channel check tipping chain). 
 93 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (applying the misappropriation theory); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 
(applying the classical theory). 
 94 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (applying this standard in a classical theory case); see Obus, 693 F.3d at 
285–86 (applying the Dirks tippee liability standard in a misappropriation case). In this case, a securi-
ties analyst received material, nonpublic information from an insider of Equity Funding of America 
(“Equity Funding”) that the corporation was overstating its assets. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49. The 
insider tipped the analyst so that the analyst could expose the fraud. Id. at 649–50. The analyst con-
firmed the fraud and discussed the information he had obtained through his investigation with clients 
and investors, some of whom sold their shares of Equity Funding thereby avoiding losses when the 
fraud became public and stock prices dropped. Id. The SEC and U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia found that the analyst violated insider trading laws under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 650–52. 
 95 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (noting that tipping is viewed properly only as a means of indirectly 
violating the Cady, Roberts disclose or abstain from trading rule). 
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ingly participate with a fiduciary in such a breach are “as forbidden” from the 
improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.96 
The Court went on to hold that whether a disclosure by the tipper is a 
breach of a duty, thereby implicating the tippee’s derivative liability, depends 
on the purpose of the disclosure.97 Observing that not all disclosures or “tips” 
of confidential corporate information violate the duty insiders owe to share-
holders, the Court stated that the test for whether an insider breached his or her 
duty was “whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, 
from the disclosure.”98 Without such a legal limitation, the Court noted, market 
participants would be at the mercy of the SEC’s litigation strategy.99 
C. Materiality and Scienter 
To be held liable for insider trading, two additional elements must be es-
tablished: materiality and scienter.100 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a 
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.101 Therefore, a fact is ma-
terial under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if there is a substantial likelihood 
that the disclosure of the fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as hav-
ing significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.102 The 
materiality standard is extraordinarily broad and potentially encompasses a 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Id. (explaining how a contrary rule would “open up opportunities for devious dealings in the 
name of others that the trustee could not conduct in his own”). 
 97 Id. at 662 (recognizing that the purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate the “use of in-
side information for personal advantage”). 
 98 Id. (“Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent 
a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”). The Court noted the typical scenario where an 
insider discloses nonpublic information without deriving any personal benefit from it or breaching his 
or her fiduciary duty. Id. The Court acknowledged that such a question of fact would not always be 
easy for courts to apply, but recognized the importance in having a “guiding principle for those whose 
daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s insider trading rules.” Id. at 664. 
 99 Id. at 664 n.24 (noting that the rule supported by the SEC would have no limiting principle, and 
without legal limitations, market participants would be forced into the hazardous position of having to 
rely on the reasonableness of the SEC’s enforcement tactics and litigation strategy). 
 100 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 447 (discussing the elements of insider trading liability). 
 101 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that the materiality 
standard requires a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the infor-
mation would effect the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder); see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (hold-
ing that an insider will be liable under Rule 10b-5 for insider trading only where he or she fails to 
disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it). 
 102 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 45–46 (2011) (holding that it was possible 
that a reasonable investor would have viewed a report linking the drug Zicam with anosmia (loss of 
smell) as significantly altering the total mix of information available when making an investment 
decision); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (expressly adopting the TSC Indus-
tries standard of materiality for section 10(b)). 
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great deal of information that would have no effect on the value of a company 
or the pricing of its securities.103 
Liability for insider trading also requires proof of scienter, which is de-
fined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud.”104 To determine scienter in insider trading, courts focus on objective 
criteria, such as whether the insider receives a personal benefit from the disclo-
sure through a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into 
future earnings.105 Under the Exchange Act, there is no criminal liability for 
insider trading unless the defendant acts “willfully.”106 Willfulness requires the 
defendant to know he or she was acting wrongfully under the securities 
laws.107 Under the common law, this knowledge requirement (mens rea) is a 
necessary element in every crime and requires that the defendant knew the 
facts that made his or her willful conduct illegal.108 The Second Circuit has 
recognized that there should be a high mens rea standard for criminal liability, 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 318 (2007) (discussing the implications of the expansive materi-
ality standard in light of new disclosure mandates); see Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guid-
ance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2003) (dis-
cussing the complexities of trying to apply the ambiguous materiality standard for transaction plan-
ners, litigants, government agencies, and courts). 
 104 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23 (“Scienter . . . is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 viola-
tion.”); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 (holding that the relevant legislative history of the Exchange Act 
supports the Court’s conclusion that section 10(b) was targeted at practices involving some element of 
scienter, not merely negligence); Newman I, 773 F.3d at 447 (stating that liability for insider trading 
also requires proof that the defendant acted with scienter). Negligently disclosing material, nonpublic 
information is not enough. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. 
 105 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663. The theory behind this requirement is that the insider, by giving out 
information selectively, is in effect selling the information for cash, reciprocal information, or other 
value. Id.; Brudney, supra note 48, at 348. Thus, in Dirks, the Court held that the tippers did not 
breach their duty to shareholders because they received no personal gain for their disclosure of mate-
rial, nonpublic information—they merely wanted to expose the fraud. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666–67 (not-
ing that the tippers received no monetary or reciprocal personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s 
inside information, but rather were motivated by the desire to expose the fraud). As such, Dirks, a 
tippee who also tipped to others, was not liable for a derivative breach because he could not have been 
a “participant after the fact” in the insiders’ breach of fiduciary duty; they and he lacked the requisite 
scienter to deceive, manipulate or defraud. Id. at 665. 
 106 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (noting that Congress intended the 
willfulness standard to provide a “sturdy safeguard[]” in insider trading cases). 
 107 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665–66 (recognizing that two safeguards Congress implemented regard-
ing scienter are (1) the government must prove that a person “willfully” violated a provision and (2) 
he or she must have knowledge of the rule); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23 (noting that scienter requires 
an intentional or willful mindset, not merely that an insider’s conduct results in harm to investors). 
 108 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (explaining that mens rea, which requires 
that a defendant knows the facts that make his or her conduct illegal, is a necessary element in every 
crime); Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450 (noting that mens rea is a required element in criminal insider 
trading case). 
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especially in remote tippee cases.109 The U.S. Supreme Court has not settled 
the dispute whether recklessness satisfies section 10(b)’s scienter requirement 
in civil cases, however lower courts have embraced and applied a recklessness 
standard.110 
II. WHAT’S THE ISSUE? NEWMAN FOCUSES ON THE KNOWLEDGE 
REQUIREMENT FOR REMOTE TIPPEE LIABILITY 
In 2014, in United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that defendant tippees did not have the requisite scienter to be convicted 
of insider trading.111 Section A of this Part provides an overview of Newman 
and presents the arguments for both sides.112 Section B highlights the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Newman.113 Finally, section C discusses how the Second 
Circuit also circumscribed what constitutes a personal benefit under insider 
trading law.114 
A. United States v. Newman: Arguments for Both Sides 
In United States v. Newman, defendants Todd Newman and Anthony 
Chiasson were hedge fund managers for Diamondback Capital and Level 
Global Investors, respectively.115 Both Newman and Chiasson traded on non-
public information about Dell and NVIDIA that Newman’s analyst at Dia-
mondback provided to them.116 Newman and Chiasson were three or four de-
grees removed from the insider tippers at Dell and NVIDIA.117 As such, nei-
                                                                                                                           
 109 United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Unlike securities fraud, insider 
trading does not necessarily involve deception, and it is easy to imagine an insider trader who receives 
a tip and is unaware that his conduct was illegal and therefore wrongful.”). 
 110 Obus, 693 F.3d at 286 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide whether reckless-
ness satisfies section 10(b) for civil cases, but that the Second Circuit has recognized a recklessness 
standard). 
 111 See United States v. Newman (Newman I), 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
United States v. Newman (Newman II), 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (mem.). 
 112 See infra notes 115–127 and accompanying text. 
 113 See infra notes 128–127 and accompanying text. 
 114 See infra notes 134–146 and accompanying text. 
 115 Brief for the United States of America at 3, Newman I, 773 F.3d 438 (No. 13-1917), 2013 WL 
6163307. 
 116 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 443. 
 117 Id. (discussing a brief summary of the two tipping chains at issue). At issue in Newman were 
two tipping chains: Dell and NVIDIA. Id. With respect to Dell, the tipping chain was as follows: Rob 
Ray, who worked in Dell’s investor relations department (insider-tipper) gave information about 
Dell’s earnings to Sandy Goyal, an analyst at Neuberger Berman, who in turn gave the information to 
Diamondback analyst Jesse Tortora, who relayed the information to Newman as well as Level Global 
analyst Sam Adondakis, who ultimately provided the information to Chiasson. Id. With respect to the 
NVIDIA tipping chain: Chris Choi, a member of NVIDIA’s finance unit, tipped information to Hyung 
Lim, a former executive at Broadcom Corp. and Altera, who in turn passed the information to Danny 
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ther Newman nor Chiasson knew the insider tippers at Dell or NVIDIA, nor 
why they divulged this information.118 Regardless, both men were indicted and 
convicted of insider trading in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York.119 
The main issue on appeal was whether a remote tippee could be guilty of 
insider trading if he or she does not know that the corporate insider disclosed 
information in exchange for a personal benefit.120 The government argued that 
the insiders at Dell and NVIDIA breached their duties of confidentiality by 
tipping material, nonpublic information to others who tipped or traded on the 
basis of that information. 121 Under tipper-tippee liability, Newman and Chias-
son, as tippees, would be derivatively liable if they knew that such a breach 
occurred.122 The district court instructed the jury that the defendant tippees 
could be liable if they knew the inside information was disclosed by the insid-
ers in breach of a fiduciary duty of trust and confidence.123 The jury found that 
                                                                                                                           
Kuo, an analyst at Whittier Trust, who circulated the information to his group of analyst friends in-
cluding Tortora and Adondakis, who informed Newman and Chiasson, respectively. Id. 
 118 Id. (noting that there was no evidence that either Newman or Chiasson, who were several steps 
removed from the corporate insiders, was aware of the source of the inside information); Brief for 
Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson, supra note 12, at 1. 
 119 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 444–45. 
 120 Id. at 442 (stating that the issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that it must find that a tippee knew that the insider disclosed confidential information 
in exchange for a personal benefit); Brief for Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson, supra note 12, 
at 3 (arguing that absent knowledge that a tipper exchanged inside information for personal gain, 
defendants did not engage in conduct in violation of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5). 
 121 See Brief for the United States of America, supra note 115, at 17–27. The government’s ar-
gument falls within the classical theory of insider trading. See id. at 55 (arguing that the defendants’ 
attempts to distinguish precedent based on misappropriation theory inappropriate because the same 
analysis applies to this classical theory case). 
 122 Compare id. at 35 (arguing that all the government had to establish was that the defendants 
traded on material, nonpublic information they knew insiders had disclosed in violation of a duty of 
confidentiality), with Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (holding that a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders of a corporation only when the insider has breached his or her fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach). 
 123 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 444; Brief for the United States of America, supra note 115, at 36–37. 
Specifically, the district court instructed the jury that the defendants could be held liable if all of the 
following elements were met: 
(1) the tippers had a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence with 
their employers such that they were entrusted with material, nonpublic information with 
the reasonable expectation that they would keep it confidential and not use it for per-
sonal benefit; (2) the tippers intentionally breached that duty by disclosing material, 
nonpublic information for their own benefit; (3) the tippers received a personal benefit 
from the tips; (4) the defendant tippees knew the inside information was disclosed by 
the insiders in breach of a duty of trust and confidence; and (5) the defendant tippees 
participated in the insider trading scheme knowingly, willfully, and with specific intent 
to defraud. 
Brief for the United States of America, supra note 115, at 36–37 (emphasis added). 
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the government had proven this element and both men were found guilty of 
insider trading.124 
Newman and Chiasson appealed, arguing that this jury instruction was er-
roneous.125 They asserted that, under Dirks, they could be liable only if they 
knew that the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit, and be-
cause neither knew the tippers, they could not be liable for insider trading.126 
They urged that it is the personal benefit element that turns the breach of fidu-
ciary duty into a fraudulent activity prohibited by section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and Rule 10b-5.127 
B. The Holding: Tippees Must Know of the Personal Benefit Derived  
by the Insider Tipper to Be Liable 
In its pivotal decision, the Second Circuit panel agreed with defendants’ 
argument that the Government must prove that the tippee knew both (1) that an 
insider disclosed confidential information and (2) that he or she did so in ex-
change for a personal benefit.128 The court was clear: the exchange of confi-
dential information for a personal benefit is not separate from an insider’s 
breach of his or her fiduciary duty; it is the breach that triggers liability for 
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.129 Thus, the Second Circuit held that the 
jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to instruct the jurors on 
this essential element, specifically that Newman and Chiasson must have 
known of the personal benefit received by the insiders in exchange for the dis-
closure of material nonpublic information.130 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 444. The district court sentenced Newman to fifty-four months of im-
prisonment followed by one year of supervised release, required Newman to forfeit $737,724 from the 
fraudulent trades, and imposed a $1,000,000 fine. Id. The district court sentenced Chiasson to seventy-
eight months of imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release, required Chiasson to forfeit 
$1,382,217, and imposed a $5,000,000 fine. Id. at 444–45. Both Newman and Chiasson were granted 
bail pending appeal. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 115, at 3. 
 125 Brief for Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson, supra note 12, at 2; Brief of Defendant-
Appellant Todd Newman at 3, Newman I, 773 F.3d 438 (No. 13-1917), 2013 WL 6827040. 
 126 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (holding that the test is whether the insider personally will benefit from 
his or her disclosure); Brief for Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson, supra note 125, at 2 (arguing 
that it is not a crime to trade on information, even if Chiasson knew it was coming from insiders be-
cause he did not know why they divulged the information); Brief of Defendant-Appellant Todd New-
man, supra note 125, at 2 (noting that the government did not even try to prove that Newman had such 
knowledge). 
 127 Brief of Defendant-Appellant Todd Newman, supra note 125, at 26 (arguing that the key fact 
that distinguishes legal from illegal activity is a personal benefit to the insider). 
 128 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 442. 
 129 Id. at 447–48 (“Dirks counsels us that the exchange of confidential information for personal 
benefit is not separate from an insider’s fiduciary breach; it is the fiduciary breach that triggers liabil-
ity for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.”). 
 130 Id. at 442. The Newman Court also held that the evidence against Newman and Chiasson was 
insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for two reasons: (1) “the Government’s evidence of any person-
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The court also expressly rejected the government’s argument that because 
Newman and Chiasson were sophisticated traders, they must have known, or 
deliberately avoided knowing, that the information originated from a breach of 
a fiduciary duty by a corporate insider who received some kind of personal 
benefit for such a disclosure.131 Indeed the court found that defendants had 
established facts that negated such an inference against them.132 The Second 
Circuit recognized that disclosures of information for reasons other than benefit-
ting the tipper are routine in the securities markets and do not violate insider 
trading law.133 
C. The Second Circuit Circumscribes What Constitutes a Personal Benefit 
The Second Circuit panel went a step further and held that the govern-
ment also failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the insiders received 
                                                                                                                           
al benefit received by the alleged insiders was insufficient to establish the tipper liability from which 
defendants’ purported tippee liability would derive,” and (2) “the Government presented no evidence 
that Newman and Chiasson knew that they were trading on information obtained from insiders in 
violation of those insiders’ fiduciary duties.” Id. Importantly, the Second Circuit stated that this ele-
ment for tipping liability applies equally to both the classical and misappropriation theories of insider 
trading. Id. at 446. 
 131 Id. at 454 (“The Government argues that . . . Newman and Chiasson must have known, or 
deliberately avoided knowing, that the information originated with corporate insiders, and that those 
insiders disclosed the information in exchange for a personal benefit. We disagree.”). 
 132 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 454–55. Importantly, the Newman Court found the defendants estab-
lished the following facts: 
[A]nalysts at hedge funds routinely estimate metrics such as revenue, gross margin, op-
erating margin, and earnings per share through legitimate financial modeling using pub-
licly available information and educated assumptions about industry and company 
trends. . . . [A]nalysts routinely solicited information from companies in order to check 
assumptions in their models in advance of earnings announcements. . . . [I]nvestor rela-
tions departments routinely assisted analysts with developing their models. . . . [A]nd 
Dell’s investor relations personnel routinely “leaked” earnings data in advance of quar-
terly earnings. 
Id. 
 133 Id. at 448–49, 454–55 (“Although the Government might like the law to be different, nothing 
in the law requires a symmetry of information in the nation’s securities markets.”). The reasons for 
selective disclosures are numerous, and necessary in maintaining an efficient market. Brief for Defend-
ant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson, supra note 12, at 46–47 (citing Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclo-
sures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 543–48 (2002)) (“Insiders routinely 
provide nonpublic information to market participants for myriad reasons—to curry favor with large 
shareholders, to entice significant investors, to ‘condition’ the market in advance of unexpected earnings 
results, to bolster their credibility with certain analysts, to provide ‘comfort’ about investment theses, and 
other reasons.”); Scott Russell, Note, Regulation Fair Disclosure: The Death of the Efficient Capital 
Market Hypothesis and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U. L. REV. 527, 550 (2002) (noting that 
analysts interpret and relay the information in a way that individual investors can understand and use 
to assess the value of securities and make informed investment decisions); see supra notes 52–56 and 
accompanying text (discussing the important role that market insiders, such as analysts, have on a 
mechanically- and value-efficient market). 
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a personal benefit for providing material nonpublic information.134 In so doing, 
the court circumscribed what constitutes a “personal benefit” under insider 
trading law, limiting it to a quid-pro-quo type of relationship.135 The court held 
that a personal benefit cannot be merely inferred from a personal relationship 
between tipper and tippee, but rather that such an inference is only permissible 
if the government proves that there was a “meaningfully close personal rela-
tionship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and repre-
sents at least a potential gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”136 
The government filed for a petition for rehearing on both the scienter re-
quirement and what constitutes a personal benefit, but the Second Circuit de-
nied it.137 The U.S. Supreme Court also denied the government’s petition for 
certiorari without comment.138  
Since Newman, however, the Court has granted certiorari to a U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case to clarify the question about what consti-
                                                                                                                           
 134 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 451–52 (stating that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the 
government was insufficient to warrant an inference that the insiders received any personal benefit in 
exchange for their tips). As to the Dell tipping chain, tipper Ray and tippee Goyal were alumni of the 
same school and it was shown that Goyal provided some career advice and assistance to Ray. Id. at 
452. As to the NVIDIA tipping chain, tipper Choi and tippee Lim were “family friends” who attended 
the same church and occasionally socialized together. Id. The Newman Court held that providing 
evidence that a tipper and tippee are family friends or acquaintances is not sufficient to prove that the 
tippers derived some benefit from tipping. Id. 
 135 Id. (“While our case law at times emphasizes language from Dirks indicating that the tipper’s 
gain need not be immediately pecuniary, it does not erode the fundamental insight that, in order to 
form the basis for a fraudulent breach, the personal benefit received in exchange for confidential in-
formation must be of some consequence.”). 
 136 Id. In so holding, the Newman Court acknowledged the Second Circuit’s prior acceptance of a 
permissive definition of personal benefit. United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(holding that a personal benefit is broadly defined to include (1) a “pecuniary gain,” (2) any “reputa-
tional benefit that will translate into future earnings,” and (3) any benefit from a gift of information to 
a relative or friend). But, the Second Circuit qualified this permissive standard, recognizing that if the 
government merely had to show some sort of friendly relationship between the tipper and tippee to 
prove a personal benefit, the personal benefit requirement would be a nullity. Newman I, 773 F.3d at 
452 (holding that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that tippers received a 
personal benefit). 
 137 Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 23, 
at 2–3 (arguing that this refined definition of personal benefit could produce extreme and unwanted 
results, which will “dramatically limit the Government’s ability to prosecute some of the most com-
mon, culpable, and market threatening forms of insider trading”). In particular, prosecutors expressed 
concern about situations where a parent passes on a confidential stock tip to a child without receiving 
anything but the child’s love and affection, or the corporate executive who whispers to a golf buddy 
about upcoming deals. Matthew Goldstein & Ben Protess, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Challenges 
Insider Trading Ruling, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan 23, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/
01/23/u-s-attorney-preet-bharara-to-challenge-insider-trading-ruling/ (discussing prosecutors’ view 
that the Newman decision could produce extreme and unwanted results). 
 138 Newman II, 136 S. Ct. at 242. Interestingly, the government sought certiorari only on the per-
sonal benefit requirement, effectively conceding the knowledge requirement. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 15–34, Newman II, 136 S. Ct. 242 (No. 15-137); Jonathan D. Schmidt et al., What New-
man Means for the Market, 21 WESTLAW J. SEC. LIT. & REG., no. 12, Oct. 15, 2015, at *1, *5. 
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tutes a personal benefit.139 In Salman v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held 
that a personal benefit need not be a tangible, pecuniary benefit but instead can 
be a benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of information to a 
close relative or friend.140 Although some commentators have said that the 
Court will be settling a circuit split on this issue, others believe that the facts of 
Newman and Salman are distinguishable and the two sister circuits are not di-
ametrically opposed.141 As such, Newman still provides the correct framework 
for determining remote tippee liability in insider trading cases.142 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Newman reins in the expansion of insid-
er trading law that has dominated since Dirks.143 The scienter requirement 
makes it tougher for the government to sustain a case against remote tippees 
because the government must prove that a remote tippee knew of a personal 
                                                                                                                           
 139 United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 899 
(2016) (mem.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (No. 15-628), 2015 WL 
7180648 (asking the Court to answer whether a personal benefit to an insider requires proof of “an 
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary of 
similarly valuable nature,” or whether it is sufficient to show that the insider and tippee shared a close 
family relationship). 
 140 Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093–94 (declining to follow Newman to the extent it can be read to re-
quire the personal benefit received by the tipper to be tangible). In Salman, the insider-tipper, Mahar 
Kara, regularly disclosed confidential information he received from his investment banking job to his 
older brother, Michael. Id. at 1089. The defendant Salman, the brother-in-law and friend of Mahar and 
Michael, successfully traded on information he received from Michael, knowing full well that the 
information came from Mahar as the insider-tipper. Id. Salman argued that he did not know of the 
personal benefit Mahar received for disclosing the information to Michael, and that evidence of a 
family relationship alone is insufficient to prove that the insider-tipper received a benefit. Id. at 1093. 
The Ninth Circuit held that the government presented sufficient evidence that Mahar disclosed the 
information as a gift intended to benefit Michael. Id. at 1094. 
 141 Compare Newman I, 773 F.3d at 443 (dealing with remote tippees in the securities industry 
who were four degrees removed from the source of information, who did not know the insider-tipper, 
the first-degree tippee, or the relationship between the two), with Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093–94 (deal-
ing with a second-degree tippee who was a family member of both the insider-tipper and the first-
degree tippee, and who knew the personal benefit derived by the insider-tipper for disclosing the in-
formation). See generally Matt Levine, Justices Will Know Insider Trading When They See It, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Jan. 19, 2016, 5:48 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-01-19/
justices-will-know-insider-trading-when-they-see-it [https://perma.cc/A7PH-J2E9] (noting that both 
appeals courts have drawn lines in sensible, unsurprising ways based on the differences between the 
two cases). 
 142 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450 (setting out the elements the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order to sustain an insider trading conviction); Levine, supra note 141 (arguing 
that if the U.S. Supreme Court does more than simply affirm and clarify the appeals court decisions in 
Salman, it will likely narrow insider trading law, which is consistent with Newman). 
 143 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 455 (clarifying the knowledge requirement and circumscribing the 
personal benefit requirement); Schmidt et al., supra note 138, at *6 (discussing how Newman makes it 
more difficult for the government to bring cases against remote tippees especially when evidence of a 
personal benefit and knowledge of that benefit is thin); Tebsy Paul, Comment, Friends with Benefits: 
Analyzing the Implications of United States v. Newman for the Future of Insider Trading, 5 AM. U. 
BUS. L. REV. 109, 112 (2015) (noting how Newman put an end to the government’s “recent crusade” 
against insider trading in which the government has stretched precedent through “scant evidence”). 
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benefit to an insider—something a tippee multiple degrees removed from the 
insider-tipper will not likely know.144 Additionally, the standard for what con-
stitutes a personal benefit also makes it harder for the government to sustain a 
case against a remote tippee because the government relies heavily on circum-
stantial evidence to prove its case.145 The government can no longer simply 
infer a personal benefit from a relationship between tipper and tippee; the gov-
ernment must prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.146 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEWMAN: CONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT, 
CRITICAL FOR FUTURE REMOTE TIPPEE INSIDER TRADING DEFENDANTS 
The Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Newman stays true to the 
duty-based theory of liability upon which insider trading law and an efficient 
market theory rests.147 Additionally, the Newman decision prevents the gov-
ernment from prosecutorial over-reaching in the future.148 Section A of this Part 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWEFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES 
FRAUD § 6:315.90 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that the government will be less likely to target remote tippees 
in future cases); DIXIE L. JOHNSON & MATTHEW B. HANSON, KING & SPALDING, CLIENT ALERT: POST-
NEWMAN REALITY: INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING UNWITTING ‘TIPS’ TO CLOSE FRIENDS AND RELA-
TIVES WILL CONTINUE 5 (2015), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/kspublic/library/publication/
ca100815.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8YN-DCEW] (noting that Newman will undoubtedly change prose-
cutors’ calculations for investigations involving tipping chains among business colleagues). In 2015, 
in response to the Newman decision, three bills aimed at defining and even outlawing insider trading 
were introduced in Congress. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015); Stop 
Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015); Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1097, 
114th Cong. (2015); see Fokas & Fradkin, supra note 37, at *3 (noting how each bill is aimed at over-
ruling Newman and removing the personal benefit requirement). 
 145 See BROMBERG & LOWEFELS, supra note 144, § 6:315.90 (noting how the government will 
have to work harder to produce such evidence); Yin Wilczek, SEC to Pursue More Insider Trading 
Cases in Administrative Forum, Director Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 13, 2014), http://www.bna.
com/sec-pursue-insider-n17179891282/ [https://perma.cc/JX39-Q7AZ] (noting how insider trading 
cases usually turn on circumstantial evidence). 
 146 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (refusing to make the inference of a personal benefit based sole-
ly on circumstantial evidence of a relationship between tipper and tippee); Gina LaMonica, Second 
Circuit Narrows Scope of Remote Tippee Liability in Landmark Insider Trading Decision, WHITE 
COLLAR BRIEFLY (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.whitecollarbriefly.com/2014/12/10/second-circuit-
narrows-scope-of-remote-tippee-liability-in-landmark-insider-trading-decision/ [https://perma.cc/
SY2A-MXVS] (noting how the Newman decision “raise[s] the bar” for the government’s burden of 
proof in remote tippee cases). 
 147 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (holding that liability is based on 
breach of duty to a source of information); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (holding that lia-
bility is based on breach of a fiduciary duty); United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) 
(same); United States v. Newman (Newman I), 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014) (same), cert. denied, 
United States v. Newman (Newman II), 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (mem.); see also Coles, supra note 46, 
at 211 (arguing that the adoption of the misappropriation theory and lower courts’ expansive applica-
tion of the personal benefit and tippee knowledge requirement have led to the de facto demise of Dirks 
as a predictable framework for analyzing tippee liability). 
 148 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 442; James Fanto, Financial Professionals Face Heightened SEC 
Insider Trading Enforcement: Line-Drawing Issues and the Compliance Response, in ASPATORE 
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argues that the Second Circuit decision in Newman is consistent with U.S. Su-
preme Court and Second Circuit precedent, as well as fundamental principles of 
criminal law.149 Section B explains the importance Newman has on reining in 
prosecutorial overreaching by the government in insider trading cases. Section B 
further argues that the government should focus its aim on prosecuting insider-
tippers rather than trying to expand insider trading law to capture remote tip-
pees.150 
A. The Second Circuit’s Decision in Newman Is Consistent with  
Precedent and the Principles of Criminal Law 
Although categorized by the government as a drastic departure from es-
tablished insider trading law, the Second Circuit’s decision in Newman is actu-
ally consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent set in Chiarella and 
Dirks.151 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 forbid securities 
fraud, not breaches of fiduciary duty.152 In Dirks, the Court was clear that 
whether disclosure of confidential information in breach of a fiduciary duty con-
stituted fraud was contingent on the purpose of the disclosure.153 To constitute 
fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5, the insider must personally benefit, either di-
rectly or indirectly, from the disclosure of material, nonpublic information.154 
Therefore, as the Second Circuit in Newman recognized, receiving a personal 
benefit from a breach of fiduciary duty (disclosing material, nonpublic infor-
mation) is what makes the breach a fraud under Rule 10b-5.155 Following the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s logic, the Second Circuit held that a tippee could not be 
                                                                                                                           
SPECIAL REPORT: SEC ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS: AN IMMEDIATE LOOK 
AT RECENT SEC INVESTIGATIONS INTO ALLEGED INSIDER TRADING ACTIVITY 5 (2011) (discussing 
how the SEC’s prosecution tactics expand the boundaries of insider trading liability). 
 149 See infra notes 151–176 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 177–214 and accompanying text. 
 151 Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 23, 
at 1 (claiming that the Newman decision breaks with U.S. Supreme Court and Second Circuit prece-
dent); cf. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12 (characterizing tippee liability as 
arising from tippee’s role after the fact in the insider’s breach of duty). 
 152 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R 
§ 240.10b-5 (2015); see supra note 19 (discussing statutory basis for insider trading law). 
 153 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (stating the principle that in insider trading cases fraud derives 
from the use of information for a personal benefit rather than for a corporate purpose, which is the 
sole intended use of such information). The Dirks Court also states that insiders “may not give such 
[inside] information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for 
their personal gain.” Id. at 659 (emphasis added). 
 154 Id. at 662 (“Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And 
absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”). 
 155 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 447–48 (“[T]he exchange of confidential information for personal bene-
fit is not separate from an insider’s fiduciary breach; it is the fiduciary breach . . . .”). 
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held liable under 10b-5 unless he or she knew that the insider received a personal 
benefit for disclosing the information.156 
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s standard for what constitutes a personal 
benefit can hardly be seen as a drastic departure from precedent.157 Although 
Newman did not turn on whether there was a personal benefit to the insider-
tippers, the court clarified that to prove a personal benefit to an insider-tipper the 
government must at the very least show evidence of an intention to benefit the 
tippee.158 In so holding, the court recognized that the standard for what consti-
tutes a personal benefit is permissive but not without limits, and it is the gov-
ernment’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was in fact a 
personal benefit of some consequence to the insider-tipper.159 This limiting prin-
ciple is especially important when the government pursues remote tippees like 
Newman and Chiasson, because the government should not be allowed to infer 
that a remote tippee should have known that a personal benefit was conferred on 
an insider-tipper solely because he or she had a relationship with the first-degree 
tippee.160 This position is consistent with Dirks as well as prior Second Circuit 
precedent.161 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Id. The government’s argument, that a tippee only needed to know that the tipper breached his or 
her fiduciary duty to be criminally liable, was premised on ambiguous language in Dirks and dicta in 
other Second Circuit decisions post-Dirks about the tippee knowledge requirement. Id. Selectively citing 
from Dirks, without acknowledging the personal benefit test as part-and-parcel with its holding, the gov-
ernment argued that a tippee only needs to know that a tipper disclosed information in breach of his or 
her duty of confidentiality. Id. at 448. The Second Circuit flatly rejected this argument while also slam-
ming the government for its “doctrinal novelty” in not only this case, but its other recent insider trading 
prosecutions. Id. 
 157 See Dirks 463 U.S. at 664 (noting the objective criteria for determining personal benefit as a 
pecuniary gain or reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings); Newman I, 773 F.3d at 
452 (noting that the personal benefit element would be a nullity if all the government had to prove 
was that two individuals were alumni of the same school or attended the same church); Petition of the 
United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 23, at 1 (arguing the 
Newman decision is a drastic departure from precedent). 
 158 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 452 (requiring evidence of a quid-pro-quo relationship between 
tipper and tippee or an intention to benefit the tippee). 
 159 Id. (discussing the permissive personal benefit standard previously adopted by the Second 
Circuit but stating that it has important limits). 
 160 Id. In Newman, the government argued that, as sophisticated traders, Newman and Chiasson 
must have known that the information originated with corporate insiders and that those insiders disclosed 
the information in exchange for a personal benefit. Id. at 443–44. Refusing to make such a leap in the 
context of a securities industry case, the Second Circuit clarified that a personal benefit cannot be 
inferred merely from a personal relationship between two people—the government has the burden to 
prove it. Id. at 452. Under Newman, such an inference would also be impermissible on the facts of 
Salman, which involved less remote tippees. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016) (mem.). The government still has the burden to 
prove establish that there was a personal benefit and that a tippee knew of the personal benefit, which 
is something the government could do in Salman because it provided evidence that the remote tippee 
knew the insider tipped a family member to benefit that family member with private gains. See id. 
 161 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (defining a personal benefit with objective criteria); Newman I, 773 
F.3d at 452 (holding that a personal benefit must be of some consequences); United States v. Jiau, 734 
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Moreover, the Second Circuit easily distinguished prior Second Circuit de-
cisions on which the government’s novel argument rested.162 In these earlier cas-
es, the tippee either directly participated in the tipper’s breach and therefore 
clearly knew of the tipper’s personal benefit, or was explicitly apprised of the 
tipper’s personal gain by an intermediary tippee.163 Therefore, the tippee’s 
knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit was never in question in these cases, 
and the Second Circuit’s cursory recitation of the elements for tippee liability did 
not serve as a basis for extending criminal liability for remote tippees.164 As the 
Second Circuit made clear, no precedent supported finding Newman and Chias-
son liable.165   
The Second Circuit’s Newman decision also comports with two fundamen-
tal principles of criminal law: giving fair notice of what is illegal, and protecting 
against arbitrary enforcement of the law.166 The Second Circuit’s decision pro-
                                                                                                                           
F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013), (holding that a personal benefit is broadly defined to include the benefit 
one would receive from the gift of information to a relative or friend). 
 162 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 448–49 (noting that the law does not require a parity of information in 
the securities markets). 
 163 Id.; Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153 (tippee received information directly from insider-tipper in exchange 
for personal benefits such as meals, gifts of inside information regarding other securities, and an invi-
tation to join an investment club); United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 2001) (tippee 
paid insider-tipper $200 for pre-release copies of a news publication containing material, confidential 
information); S.E.C. v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998) (tippee received information directly 
from insider-tipper and thus clearly knew of the personal benefit to tipper for disclosing the material 
nonpublic information); United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). 
 164 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 448. The elements of criminal liability for insider trading are as fol-
lows: 
(1) the insider-tippers . . . were entrusted the duty to protect confidential information, 
which (2) they breached by disclosing [the information] to their tippee . . . who (3) 
knew of [the tippers’] duty and (4) still used the information to trade a security or fur-
ther tip the information for [the tippee’s] benefit, and finally (5) the insider-tippers ben-
efited in some way from the disclosure. 
Jiau, 734 F.3d at 152–53. 
 165 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 448. (“We note that the Government has not cited, nor have we found, a 
single case in which tippees as remote as Newman and Chiasson have been held criminally liable for 
insider trading.”). The Newman Court also came down hard on the district court judge who adopted the 
government’s novel extension of tippee liability by approving of the erroneous jury instructions. Id. at 
449 (“In reaching [our] conclusion, we join every other district court to our knowledge—apart from 
Judge Sullivan—that has confronted this question.”). 
 166 See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 335, 336–37 (2005) (discussing the doctrines comprising the legality principle). Essentially, 
the legality principle holds that criminal liability and punishment can only be based on prior legisla-
tive enactment prohibiting conduct that is expressed with adequate precision and clarity). Id. The 
legality principle requires giving fair notice of what conduct is illegal. See McBoyle v. United States, 
283 U.S. 23, 27 (1931) (reversing a conviction for transporting a stolen airplane across state lines 
because defendant did not have fair notice that the statutory definition of “motor vehicle” included an 
airplane); Robinson, supra, at 340 (noting that fair notice is especially important in criminal law, 
where a defendant’s life and liberty are often at stake). This principle puts a premium on individual 
autonomy and allows people to make choices about their behavior that is in line with the law. See Robin-
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vides market participants with notice of what is fraudulent activity in violation of 
Rule 10b-5, specifically, that tippees must have knowledge that an insider-tipper 
received a personal benefit in exchange for inside information.167 Moreover, the 
Newman decision comports with the Exchange Act that provides that there is no 
criminal liability unless the defendant acts “willfully.”168 Tippee knowledge of 
an insider’s personal benefit is critical because otherwise, a remote tippee’s lia-
bility would depend on facts beyond his or her knowledge or control.169 
The government has argued that giving notice of what is illegal may actual-
ly encourage loophole behavior because it clarifies what someone can get away 
with without actually breaking the law.170 Thus, in insider trading cases, the gov-
ernment has argued it needs to maintain a degree of flexibility to deal with new 
                                                                                                                           
son, supra, at 343 n.25 (discussing how it is fair for people to know what the law is and to be able to 
conform their conduct accordingly); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012) (requiring “willfulness” for 
criminal liability); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (recognizing the willfulness standard as necessary safe-
guard in insider trading cases). 
 167 Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450. The court explained, 
Our conclusion also comports with well-settled principles of substantive criminal law. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Staples v. United States, under the common law, 
mens rea, which requires that the defendant know the facts that make his conduct ille-
gal, is a necessary element in every crime. Such a requirement is particularly appropri-
ate in insider trading cases where we have acknowledged “it is easy to imagine a . . . 
trader who receives a tip and is unaware that his conduct was illegal and therefore 
wrongful.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 
2010)); see J. Kelly Strader, (Re)conceptualizing Insider Trading, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1440 
(2015) (noting that Newman “goes a long way towards clarifying” the mens rea required for tippees in 
insider trading cases). 
 168 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). This also comports with the prior U.S. Supreme Court holding that tip-
pees are not as culpable as insider-tippers. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 
299, 313 (1985) (“In the context of insider trading, we do not believe that a person whose liability is 
solely derivative can be said to be as culpable as one whose breach of duty gave rise to that liability in 
the first place.”). 
 169 Brief for Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson, supra note 12, at 29 (noting that the contra-
ry rule argued for by the government would make no sense and would be inconsistent with fundamen-
tal mens rea principles and express “willfulness” standard of the Exchange Act). Indeed, under the 
government’s argued approach, an investor’s ordinarily lawful activity could become fraudulent based 
on facts entirely outside of his or her control. Id. For example, an investor may lawfully trade in secu-
rities of an issuer based on material nonpublic information routinely leaked by the issuer. Id. If it turns 
out, however, that the disclosure the investor received from the issuer was motivated by the issuer 
insider’s expectation of a personal benefit, a fact completely unknown to the investor, the investor 
could nonetheless be imprisoned for trading. Id. To be liable, the investor would only have to be 
aware that the tipper’s disclosure violated some duty of confidentiality. Id. at 30. 
 170 Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 23, 
at 24 (arguing that the Newman decision provides a “virtual roadmap for savvy hedge-fund managers 
and other traders to insulate themselves form tippee liability by knowingly placing themselves at the 
end of a chain of inside information and avoiding learning the details about the sources of obviously 
confidential and improperly disclosed information”); see also Comeau, supra note 39, at 1299 (stating 
that the SEC’s policy is to keep the scope of insider trading liability as broad as possible to avoid 
setting out a “roadmap to fraud”). 
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schemes, so as not to provide a “roadmap” for committing securities fraud.171 
When an individual’s liberty is at stake, however, as with criminal insider trading 
cases, the need for a clear standard for liability outweighs the government’s in-
terest in being able to extend its prosecutorial range.172 
A second bedrock principle of criminal law is that there shall be no retroac-
tive judicial enlargement of criminal law.173 But, since Dirks, the government 
has attempted to extend the scope of insider trading law to cover remote tippees 
who do not know whether an insider received a personal benefit, thereby retroac-
tively enlarging what is forbidden under criminal law.174 The SEC’s recent pros-
ecutorial tactics, targeting remote tippees using novel theories of liability, shows 
how vague laws such as section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be enforced arbitrari-
ly.175 The Newman decision sets essential limits on the government’s power to 
                                                                                                                           
 171 See Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 
23, at 24 (noting how tippees could insulate themselves from liability by consciously avoiding know-
ing the details behind the disclosure of information by the insider tipper). This also appears to be the 
reason why Congress has been reluctant to pass legislation expressly defining the contours of insider 
trading liability. See Peter J. Henning, Insider Trading Case Could Push Congress to Define a Murky 
World, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/business/
dealbook/insider-trading-case-could-push-congress-to-define-a-murky-world.html?emc=edit_dlb
kam_20150224&nl=business&nlid=70754771 (noting that that the congressional “cure,” or legisla-
tion, could be worse than the “disease” or common law of insider trading as it stands today). 
 172 See Robinson, supra note 166, at 340 (noting the imperative for fair notice in criminal law, 
where a defendant’s life and liberty hang in the balance); Michael Faure et al., The Regulator’s Di-
lemma: Caught Between the Need for Flexibility & the Demands of Foreseeability. Reassessing the 
Lex Certa Principle, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 283, 289 (2014) (discussing the dilemma inherent in 
regulations that impose criminal sanctions that need to be flexible enough to cover unforeseeable 
target behavior while maintaining legal certainty required by the legality principles); see also Newman 
I, 773 F.3d at 451 (noting that few events in life are more important than an individual’s criminal 
conviction). 
 173 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); id. § 10, cl. 1 
(“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”); Robinson, supra note 166, at 353 (noting 
that ex post facto judicial action altering a penal rule retrospectively offends the legality principle just 
as an ex post facto criminal law). The rationale for prohibiting retroactive judicial enlargement of 
statutory language is also grounded on notions of fair notice and constitutional due process. See Rob-
inson, supra note 166, at 354–55 (noting that the primary rationale behind the prohibition of judicial 
interpretation is fair notice required by the due process clause). 
 174 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 448 (holding that defendants could not be liable for insider trading 
because no evidence was presented to show that they knew the source of the information or why he 
disclosed that information); cf. SEC v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding 
two New York police officers liable for trading on tips even though they did not know the identity of 
the insider-tippers nor whether they received a personal benefit because they “should have known that 
fiduciary duties were being breached with respect to confidential, non-public information”). 
 175 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 448 (criticizing the doctrinal novelty of the government’s recent 
insider trading prosecutions targeted at remote tippees many levels removed from corporate insiders); 
Doherty, supra note 2, at 489 (arguing that the broad definition of materiality is ripe for judicial or 
regulatory enlargement constituting ex post facto lawmaking); see also Schmidt et al., supra note 138, 
at *6 (arguing that the biggest takeaway from Newman is not that the narrowing of the knowledge or 
personal benefit requirements will have any affect on market professionals’ behavior, but rather that 
the requirement to show these will place substantive limits on prosecutors and regulators). 
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bring insider trading claims, articulating clearer standards for insider trading lia-
bility that comport with these basic principles of criminal law.176 
B. Reining in the SEC’s Expansion of Insider Trading Law  
Is a Good Thing . . . Really! 
Insider trading, to some extent, is inevitable under an efficient market theo-
ry.177 Unless Congress expressly adopts a parity-of-information approach 
through legislation, this is the theory upon which the common law of insider 
trading rests.178 The Newman decision clarifies the area of remote tippee liability, 
which has cast a shadow over the securities markets since Dirks.179 Subsection 1 
discusses the importance of the Newman decision with the advent of the SEC 
bringing more cases in-house.180 Subsection 2 argues that the SEC should focus 
on prosecuting insider-tippers rather than downstream tippees.181 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450 (holding that for a tippee defendant to be liable he or she must 
know of a personal benefit to the insider tipper that is of some consequence); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. 
at 664 n.24 (“Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the reasonableness of 
the SEC’s litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the facts of this case make plain.”); Jill E. 
Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 
179, 247–48 (1991) (discussing how many insider trading defendants are receiving prison sentences 
even though the government’s prosecutions present judicial issues of first impression, implicating 
obvious due process concerns). Since the Newman decision, fourteen of more than ninety insider trading 
convictions have been set aside. Neil Weinberg & Patricia Hurtado, Gordon and Bud Did It. Did You? 
Insider Trading Gets a Rethink, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-02-16/gordon-and-bud-did-it-did-you-insider-trading-gets-a-rethink [https://perma.cc/
B4JZ-PV5H]. 
 177 See Engle, supra note 52, at 67 (discussing how information is inevitably asymmetric and 
therefore, to some extent, nonpublic). 
 178 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (holding that liability is based on breach of duty to a source of 
information); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (holding that liability is based on a breach of a fiduciary or simi-
lar duty); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (same); cf. Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) 
(adopting a definition and prohibiting insider trading in the European Union); Edward Greene & Oliv-
ia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 372 (noting that the Market 
Abuse Directive, the codification of the prohibition on trading on material, nonpublic information in 
the European Union, is premised on a parity-of-information approach). 
 179 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450 (stating that to sustain an insider trading conviction against a 
tippee, the government must prove (1) the corporate insider had a fiduciary duty; (2) the corporate 
insider breached his or her fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confidential information to a tippee (b) in 
exchange for a personal benefit; (3) the tippee knew the information was confidential and divulged for 
personal benefit; and (4) the tippee still used that information to trade in a security or tip another indi-
vidual for personal benefit). 
 180 See infra notes 182–193 and accompanying text. 
 181 See infra notes 194–214 and accompanying text. 
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1. Reining in the Expanse of Government Overreach Is Increasingly 
Important as the SEC Brings More Cases In-House 
Federal courts are indispensible in preventing the SEC from pushing its 
own unprecedented agenda in expanding the scope of insider trading law.182 In 
fiscal years 2014 and 2015, the SEC ramped up its prosecution, bringing eighty 
and eight-seven cases based on insider trading law, respectively.183 Prior to the 
2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC could only bring administrative enforcement 
actions if a respondent was a regulated entity or an individual employed by 
one.184 Now, Dodd-Frank permits the SEC unbridled discretion whether to pros-
ecute cases before its own administrative law judges (“ALJs”), rather than Arti-
cle III judges.185 The SEC has made it perfectly clear that it will use its discre-
tion to prosecute inside trading cases in an advantageous forum, but it has failed 
to articulate guidelines for how it would choose the forum.186 An advantageous 
forum for the SEC unavoidably means that the forum will have certain disad-
vantages for an insider trading defendant.187 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See Fanto, supra note 148 (“[C]ourts will . . . always insist upon a showing of a violation of a 
duty, refusing to accept that an insider trading arises simply from the possession of material inside 
information.”); Jacquelyn Lamb, Judge Rakoff Warns About SEC’s Move to More Administrative 
Proceedings, SEC TODAY (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/securities/news/judge_
rakoff_warns_about_sec_s_move_to_more_administrative_proceedings [https://perma.cc/CF4C-
9EG5] (highlighting concerns about allowing administrative law judges (“ALJs”) to make insider 
trading law); see also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for 
FY 2015 (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html [https://perma.cc/
Y4QJ-PFAM] [hereinafter SEC Press Release] (providing SEC enforcement statistics for fiscal years 
2014 and 2015). 
 183 SEC Press Release, supra note 182; David A. Wilson, Coming to an Administrative Law 
Judge Near You: Insider-Trading Cases, 29 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP., no. 11, Dec. 9, 2014, at *1 
(noting that these figures show no signs of slowing down). 
 184 Wilson, supra note 183, at *1 (discussing how under prior law, broker-dealers, investment 
advisors, or anyone employed by either, was considered a regulated entity). 
 185 See id. (noting that respondents have no say in the matter). 
 186 See Cohen, supra note 24 (noting that Andrew Ceresney, the head of the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement, announced that the SEC planned to bring more future insider trading cases as adminis-
trative proceedings); Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL 
STREET J. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-
appoints-1413849590 (quoting Kara Brockmeyer, head of the SEC’s anti-foreign-corruption unit, who 
stated that bringing insider trading cases as administrative proceedings is the “new normal”). This serves 
to compound the existing problems presented by SEC’s tactic of shopping for judges who are more likely 
to rule favorably on the SEC’s insider trading prosecutions. See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450 n.5 (imply-
ing that prosecutors steered the case to U.S. District Court Judge Sullivan); Fanto, supra note 148 
(noting how the SEC strategically brings cases before friendly courts to establish the precedent it 
wants). 
 187 See Cohen, supra note 24 (discussing the decided advantages the SEC would enjoy if it 
brought insider trading cases as administrative proceedings); Brian Mahoney, SEC Could Bring More 
Insider Trading Cases In-House, LAW360 (Jun. 11, 2014) http://www.law360.com/articles/547183/
sec-could-bring-more-insider-trading-cases-in-house [https://perma.cc/KMT2-BXKH] (noting that 
Andrew Ceresney, head of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, admitted that even threatening in-
house proceedings gives the SEC a “leg-up” in negotiating settlements). 
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Allowing SEC administrative law judges to make the law on insider trading 
in closed-door administrative proceedings is a dangerous shift in the develop-
ment of securities fraud law.188 Indeed, there have already been constitutional 
due process challenges by respondents in these cases brought before the ALJs.189 
The advantages for the SEC bringing civil insider trading cases in-house are 
numerous, and clear from the fact that in fiscal year 2013, the SEC won 100% of 
its administrative proceedings compared to only 60% of its trials before federal 
judges.190 
With these concerns in mind, the Newman decision puts a decisive limit on 
how ALJs can rule in remote tippee cases.191 Even if the government brings civil 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Lamb, supra note 182 (discussing how some argue that a move to administrative proceed-
ings hinders the balanced development of the securities laws). Although there are limits, federal judg-
es must be highly deferential to rulings by ALJs under the Chevron doctrine. See Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (holding that a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for an administrative agency’s reasonable in-
terpretation). 
 189 Chau v. SEC, No. 14-CV-1903 LAK, 2014 WL 6984236, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014) 
(granting SEC’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claim for court’s lack 
of jurisdiction without addressing constitutional arguments); Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 513 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (allowing a constitutional equal protection argument for selective prosecution to go 
forward); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Duka v. SEC, No. 15-cv-357 
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 16, 2015) (arguing that SEC administrative proceedings are unconstitutional because 
they violate Article II of the Constitution); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and De-
mand for Jury Trial at 1, Peixoto v. SEC, No. 14-cv-08364-WHP (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2014) (arguing 
the SEC administrative proceeding violated plaintiff’s constitutional due process and equal protection 
rights); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Stilwell et al. 
v. SEC, No. 14-cv-07931-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014) (arguing that SEC administrative proceedings 
violate Article III of the Constitution). One major argument is that if the SEC prosecutes a factually-
related group, it cannot prosecute part of the group in court and the other part administratively without 
violating the Equal Protection Clause. See generally Bennett Rawicki, The Dodd-Frank Act and SEC 
Enforcement—The Significant Expansion and Remaining Limitations on the SEC’s Enforcement 
Scope and Arsenal, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 35 (2013) (discussing how the SEC will likely be limited going 
forward by selective-prosecution claims when it attempts to prosecute a factually related group of 
insider trading defendants). The same selective-prosecution argument could be made that all defend-
ants charged with insider trading are similarly situated, and therefore the government cannot bring an 
administrative proceeding against one and a federal court case against another without violating the 
equal protection clause. Id. 
 190 See Lamb, supra note 182 (noting this disparity in outcomes); see also Wilson, supra note 
183, at *1 (noting the better record the SEC has in ALJ proceedings). First, the timeline of an adminis-
trative proceeding is substantially shorter than in a federal court case. Wilson, supra note 183, at *1–2. 
Second, discovery is limited. Id. Third, standards for admissibility of evidence are lower than in federal 
courts, and hearsay is allowed. Id. at *2. Fourth, there is no jury. Id. And, fifth, a respondent has a right to 
appeal, but must first exhaust his or her administrative remedies by appealing to the SEC (which author-
ized the prosecution of the case in the first instance) before seeking appeal to a federal appeals court. Id. 
 191 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Poli-
cymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1274 (2002) (noting that under the rule of stare decisis, when a 
court interprets a statute before an agency, the judicial interpretation becomes binding precedent on 
the agency); Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of 
the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 828 (1990) (discussing how 
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cases in-house, prosecutors must still prove that a remote tippee knew that the 
tipper received a personal benefit to be liable.192 The irony is that the SEC’s role 
is to enforce regulations that make financial markets more transparent and fair, 
yet by bringing civil cases in-house based on the advantages and likelihood of 
success, the agency is engaging in arbitrary and opaque behavior that under-
mines the legitimacy of the agency and enforcement process.193 
2. Shifting Its Aim: Why the SEC Should Target Insider-Tippers 
By setting a definitive threshold for remote tippee liability, the Newman 
decision may ultimately persuade the SEC to pursue a different litigation strat-
egy aimed at the crux of the information problem: insider-tippers.194 This is 
hardly a novel idea, yet the SEC has a history of pursuing downstream tippees 
who trade on confidential information while failing to prosecute tipper-insiders 
whose breach of duty commences the tipping chain.195 The crux of the problem 
is the fraudulent disclosure of the information in the first instance, in breach of 
a duty owed to shareholders or source of information.196 
                                                                                                                           
the system of judicial review depends upon oversight by federal courts, and how federal courts create 
binding precedent on ALJs). 
 192 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450 (summarizing all of the elements the government is required to 
prove in an insider trading conviction against a tippee); Bamberger, supra note 191, at 1274 (discuss-
ing how an agency’s ability to construe an ambiguous statutory provision is foreclosed when a court 
resolves the ambiguity first). 
 193 See Wilson, supra note 183, at *4 (noting this irony and arguing that the SEC’s arbitrary and 
opaque prosecution tactics are directly in conflict with the goals of fairness and transparency con-
ferred on the agency by Congress); Eric Hammesfahr, Ceresney Defends Use of SEC Judges, CQ 
ROLL CALL: WASH. SEC. ENFORCEMENT & LIT. BRIEFING (Nov. 25, 2014), 2014 WL 6675018 (not-
ing “efficiency” as the SEC’s rationale for choosing to file in an administrative forum). Efficiency, 
however, should never trump constitutional due process. See Wilson, supra note 183, at *3–4 (noting 
that increased efficiency is a point of contention); Hammesfahr, supra (same). 
 194 See Newman I, 773 F.3d at 450 (holding that for remote tippees to be liable they must know of 
a personal benefit of some consequence that is conferred on the insider-tipper for the disclosure of 
inside information); Coles, supra note 46, at 226–27 (highlighting how insiders are in the best position 
to control disclosure and prevent manipulation of corporate actions). In fact, Japan’s prohibition on 
insider trading is limited to those who receive nonpublic information directly from a party related to a 
corporation and does not extend liability to remote tippees. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of 
Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 83 (2002) (comparing Japan’s insider trading 
law with that of the United States, European Union, and Australia). 
 195 See Coles, supra note 46, at 226 (discussing the view that there should be liability for tipping, 
but not for receiving, nonpublic information); Fisch, supra note 176, at 247–48 (proposing regulation 
of insider trading by holding insider-tippers responsible for the economic consequences of tippee 
trading). In Newman, the government only civilly charged one of the insider-tippers while completely 
failing to bring claims against the other. 773 F.3d at 443–44. The Newman Court made its displeasure 
of this prosecutorial tactic known when it called the SEC out in its opinion for such discretionary 
decisions. Id. 
 196 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (holding that liability is based on breach of duty to a source of 
information); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (holding that liability is based on a breach of a fiduciary or simi-
lar duty); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (same); see also Fisch, supra note 176, at 249 (arguing that the 
tipper should bear the penalty for insider trading because he or she is responsible for protecting the 
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So why has the SEC tried so hard to expand insider trading liability to 
pursue remote tippees when in some cases it fails to prosecute the insider-
tippers at all?197 The answer is twofold: leverage and fear.198 The government 
leverages insider-tippers to provide evidence to convict tippees further down 
the line.199 Additionally, the government has leveraged the expansive, vague 
state of insider trading law to settle cases with individual defendants and cor-
porations who would rather not challenge the resources of the federal govern-
ment and the stigma that comes along with insider trading charges.200 The gov-
ernment can merely threaten administrative proceedings and extract a settle-
ment from respondents.201 Such tactics led to the SEC recording $4.16 billion 
in disgorgements and penalties in fiscal year 2014.202 Prosecuting remote tip-
                                                                                                                           
interests of the issuer or source of information). Indeed, as Commissioner Smith of the SEC stated in 
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 200 See Michael J. Metzger, Note, Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their Relation to Substantive 
Law: Ramifications of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 575, 612 (1986) 
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pees against whom the government has the weakest case for the sake of general 
deterrence can hardly be approved as an appropriate rationale for destroying 
people’s lives and livelihoods.203 As the Court in Dirks aptly warned, without 
guiding principles market participants are subject to the mercy of the govern-
ment’s litigation strategy.204 
Newman should force the SEC to focus on those individuals who disclose 
confidential information in breach of a duty, which hurts shareholders or a 
source of the information, rather than those individuals who are three or four 
degrees removed down the tipping chain.205 The U.S. Supreme Court has made 
clear that any liability on the part of the tippee is derived from the breach of duty 
to either the shareholders of a corporation or source of information.206 By focus-
ing its prosecution strategy on insider-tippers, the government will deter insiders 
at the outset from disclosing confidential information in breach of their fiduciary 
duty.207 
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the SEC’s litigation strategy). 
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 206 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (holding that liability is based on breach of duty to a source of 
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supra note 176, at 249–50 (arguing that imposing substantial liability on tippers should adequately nip 
in the bud the practice of unlawfully tipping). 
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Even with the tougher Newman standard, the SEC has still been able to 
successfully prosecute insider trading cases against remote tippees.208 In fiscal 
year 2015, the SEC recorded $4.2 billion in disgorgements and penalties, indi-
cating that Newman has not had the extreme results that the government warned 
about.209 Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Salman is cited for the propo-
sition that the Newman standard was too restrictive, it is actually a good example 
of how the Newman decision still allows the government to successfully pursue 
criminal cases against less remote tippees.210 Even if the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Salman disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s expansive view of what constitutes a 
personal benefit, the Court will likely hold that the government still provided 
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction against the remote tippee.211 This is 
because the remote tippee was only two degrees removed from the insider-tipper 
and knew both the insider-tipper and the first-degree tippee.212 Additionally, the 
government presented sufficient evidence that the insider-tipper disclosed the 
information for the purpose of benefitting the tippee, not merely that the tipper 
and tippee were in a close familial relationship, and that the remote tippee knew 
this.213 As such, the Newman framework allows the government to prosecute 
those who are most culpable: insider-tippers and less remote tippees who know 
of the personal benefit received by the insider-tippers for disclosure of material, 
nonpublic information.214 
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CONCLUSION 
The law of insider trading remains largely convoluted, especially with at-
tempts by the SEC to expand the boundaries of the law with novel prosecution 
strategies against remote tippees. Absent intervention from Congress, federal 
courts continue to play a crucial role in circumscribing this increasingly expan-
sive area of law. The Newman decision, which clarifies remote tippee liability, 
comes at a critical juncture where the SEC’s prosecutorial tactics do not square 
with the common law. The Newman decision stays true to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding that liability for insider trading must stem from a breach of a 
fiduciary duty, either to shareholders of a corporation or a source of infor-
mation. Importantly, Newman reins in prosecutorial over-reaching aimed at 
those who are least culpable and will hopefully shift the government’s focus to 
the crux of the problem, namely corporate insiders who exchange material, 
nonpublic information for a personal benefit. 
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